Turbulent Arbitrage in Reinsurance: Regulating Capital and the Cycle
Abstract
Reinsurance prices rise after catastrophes and fall as capital accumulates, usually explained by the cost of external capital. This article reads the underwriting cycle through Anwar Shaikh’s theory of real competition. The price of a reinsurance layer is regulated by the lowest-cost reproducible form of risk capital: expected loss, plus that capital’s operating costs, plus profit-of-enterprise over the interest rate on the capital it must advance. Because collateralised vehicles post the full limit while rated reinsurers diversify, the regulating capital differs by layer, and a narrower gap between profit and interest extends the domain of collateralised capital. Sector data for 2006–2025 and firm data for fifteen reinsurers filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission show returns on equity gravitating around market-implied required returns with no measurable persistence, while net capital flows, at sector and firm level, follow return shortfalls rather than past profits. The cycle appears as a turbulent equalisation of profit rates.
- Keywords
- real competition; regulating capital; reinsurance; underwriting cycle; alternative capital
- JEL
- B51, G22, L16, E32
- Version
- November 2026
Cite as: Aslan, Ilker (2026). Turbulent Arbitrage in Reinsurance: Regulating Capital and the Cycle. Working paper, November 2026. https://ilkeraslan.github.io/papers/turbulent-arbitrage-in-reinsurance.html