Reinstatement Provisions in Catastrophe Reinsurance: The Contract Economics of Post-Loss Capacity
Abstract
Reinstatement provisions restore the limit of a catastrophe excess-of-loss treaty after a loss, on terms fixed at inception. The actuarial literature prices the clause. This paper asks why a cedent would want it. In a two-period model the cost of reinsurance capital after a first event is random, a spot market reprices cover at that cost, and the cedent chooses how much restoration to commit in advance and how much to buy afterwards. A restoration paid for on delivery at the expected spot price is a contingent forward on post-loss capacity. It has value if and only if the post-loss price is uncertain. The cedent commits more than it would buy in the dearest market and less than in the cheapest, and never the full limit. Prepayment adds a premium-smoothing motive and raises the committed amount. Full, binding restoration does not always dominate spot repurchase, and optimal restoration is smaller on remote layers. Pre-funded, collateralised restoration is dearer except on high-frequency layers. The model predicts prepaid restoration and does not explain the customary reinstatement premium.
- Keywords
- reinstatement provisions; excess-of-loss reinsurance; contract design; catastrophe risk; post-loss capacity; forward contracts
- JEL
- G22, D86, D81, G32
- Version
- November 2026
Cite as: Aslan, Ilker (2026). Reinstatement Provisions in Catastrophe Reinsurance: The Contract Economics of Post-Loss Capacity. Working paper, November 2026. https://ilkeraslan.github.io/papers/reinstatement-provisions-in-catastrophe-reinsurance.html